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Abstract 
The objective of current article is to view previous experience with real estate crises 
and taking into account such experience find suitable policy reactions to overcome 
the current Estonian crisis as smoothly as possible. Beside overall theoretical 
guidelines for overcoming the crisis, examples of Sweden and Ireland are viewed. 
The policy issues suggested for Estonia include some changes in tax laws, avoiding 
expansionary fiscal policy, making lending stricter and borrower responsible to 
higher extent, cooperation of different authorities to tackle problem of bad loans, 
initiating wage and price cut, paying more attention to exporting sector. 
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Introduction 
Recessions, crises or other problems are common in a nowadays economic 
environment, occurring systematically over time. In the light of the world economic 
downturn in 2008 Estonia faces a real estate bubble burst, which is spreading rapidly 
into the real economy. In such difficult times government has an important role to 
play and its action can lead to recovery or deterioration of the situation. Although 
problems are often country specific, depending on the monetary system, taxation, 
membership in international organizations and other factors, still several universal 
guidelines could be brought out from the previous crisis overcoming policy practice. 
The first part of current paper summarizes main theoretical and practical policy 
reactions to real estate bubble burst. The second part summarizes the course of 
different real estate bubble bursts (examples of Sweden, Ireland and Estonia). The 
last part of the paper suggests government policy measures for minimizing and 
overcoming real estate bubble burst impact on Estonian society, using also the 
comparative examples of Swedish and Irish activities. Results of the paper can be 
very well used for further academic research, but also by policy makers to widen 
their understanding of crisis processes.
1. Theoretical background 
1.1. Economic crises and real estate bubble bursts 
A very popular topic in modern economic research (both in micro- and 
macroeconomic levels) has been economic crisis, viewed from its different sides – 
policy responses to crisis, crisis management, crisis causes, crisis processes etc. The 
term crisis has a variety of different definitions, of which one is: a situation where 
there are a lot of problems that must be dealt with quickly so that the situation does 
not get worse or more dangerous (Longman English dictionary). Similarly to crisis 374
definition, economic crisis has a variety of meanings, but in the commonest sense 
we understand it as sharp downturn in economic environment that does not settle 
quickly and needs intervention. It is evident, that changes in economic environment 
must be rapid to grow into crisis, because otherwise market participants can react to 
changes swiftly without any extremes. The term crisis is often used alongside with 
terms recession, bubble burst, bust, end of cycle etc. – their meanings dependent of 
situation and of author can be the same or different. From literature we can find a 
number of different economic crisis forms: asset bubble bursts (i.e. US real estate 
market in 2008), currency crisis (i.e. Zimbabwe dollar in late 2000s), sharp rise in 
imported product prices (Russian gas price rise in 2008-2009), loss of competitive 
advantage of some industry (European clothing industry in last decades) etc. In all 
previous examples we see a sudden sharp anomaly compared to former situation, 
which without further intervention can give rise to extremely negative scenarios in 
economic environment. 
Real estate bubble burst (or real estate bust) can be seen as one example of 
economic crisis and its most common features in literature are (not necessarily all 
occurring simultaneously): 
1. remarkable decrease of real estate transactions, 
2. remarkable decrease of real estate demand and growth of real estate supply, 
3. remarkable drop in real estate prices, 
4. growth in the number of bad mortgage loans, 
5. bankruptcies and payment difficulties of real estate firms and individuals. 
In many cases the previously mentioned features succeed each other in some logical 
chain, for instance sharp drop in buying activity results in the drop of prices. In 
wider economic perspective the features of real estate bubble burst are inevitably 
connected to other economic indicators, whereas real estate bubble burst can precede 
or succeed some other crisis processes in local or international economic 
environment. For instance high unemployment can cause sharp rise in the number of 
people having payment difficulties, which in turn rises the share of property or loans 
connected to such people, eventually for instance rising real estate supply at market 
through defaulted mortgage sales. Derived from the previous when viewing a real 
estate bubble burst, its reasons and effects on economy, other processes in economic 
environment have crucial importance on determining the depth and length of real 
estate crisis.  
Literature suggests several indicators that could be used for asset bubble burst 
measurement. Most of such indicators are mainly widely used macroeconomic 
measures, which historically have proven to be good crisis markers. Detken and 
Smets use in their framework variables grouped into three categories: asset prices, 
real variables, monetary variables (Detken, Smets 2004). In case of real estate as one 
type of assets, the list of possible indicators is in many cases much more specific, 
taking into account even different qualitative measures (see Jaffee 1994b). Helbling 
proved in his work that real estate bubble burst occurs simultaneously with sharp 
slowdowns in economic activity and with outright recessions, which gives support 
for the usage of not real estate specific indicators (Helbling 2005).  375
When looking into previous literature of real estate bubble bursts, the common burst 
preceding features marked are: 
1. too risky lending (high leverage, insufficient guarantees, lack of business 
planning etc.), 
2. poor regulations (financial, bankruptcy, urban planning, real estate etc.), 
3. rapid economic growth (especially because of abnormal local consumption), 
4. low interest rates and debt growth, 
5. grown imaginary welfare. 
(see for instance: Herring, Wachter 1998; Collyns, Senhadji 2002; Berg, Ostry 1999) 
It must be noted, that due to remarkable differences in economic environment and 
situations, previously listed features can have some variation among countries and 
circumstances, but in cross-section of previous examples of features most of them 
are still present. More variation we can find in the extent and influence of specific 
features. 
1.2. Policies to overcome crisis 
Every crisis more or less needs government intervention, whether it would be with 
financial, legislative, communication or other measures. As real estate bubble burst 
is often preceded or succeeded by other problems in economy, in literature we can 
find a lot of evidence of policies of overall stabilization that are not only real estate 
sector specific. Such distinction between policies is necessary, because otherwise 
there are possibilities to interpret government action not correctly – for instance state 
loan to support some industry has definitely no direct effect on real estate sector. In 
large, the literature divides policies into two: short-term and long-term policies (see 
Moreno et al. 1998). Short-term policies are directed to solve or minimize the 
problems (economic environment stabilization), whereas long-term policies are 
directed to problem avoidance in the future and creating basis for new growth. Table 
1 gives a list of main government policies during asset bubble burst.  
Previously given policies are in many cases cross-sectoral and not only real estate 
sector specific. For instance buying problematic firms is common policy in banking 
sector, but it is tightly connected to real estate sector, as such loans can be mostly 
mortgage loans. 
An important issue lies if and to what extent should government pay to overcome 
real estate crisis and in the following examples part we see cases of government 
cost. For instance it is important to argument, whether it is justified to pay with 
government funds for losses of private firms and excessive risks taken. Different 
crisis situations have cost governments up to 25% of GDP (Caprio, Klingebiel 
1996).376
Table 1. Short-term and long-term policy measures to off-set an asset crisis 
Short-term Long-term 
1. Direct financial aid. Aid can be in a form 
of loan or irredeemable support. Recent 
evidence comes from USA financial and 
automotive sector. 
2. Reorganization of problematic firms. 
Firms are reorganized, which can mean 
breaking a firm into several parts, carrying 
out fundamental changes without breaking a 
firm, incorporating firms etc (i.e. in USA 
procedures according to Chapter 11).  
3. Buying problematic firms. Government 
buys problematic firms or a part of them (i.e. 
Parex Banka case in Latvia). 
4. Suppressing panic. Media is used as an 
instrument to avoid further serious problems 
(Russian government action, although rouble 
was devaluated). In many cases media plays 
crucial role in determining the extent and 
length of crisis. 
5. Fiscal measures. Decisions about 
taxation are common during crisis. Some 
type of fiscal measures can be still classified 
as long-term initiatives (for detailed 
discussion about fiscal measures during 
crisis see Blanchard et al. 2008). 
1. Audit of regulations that failed to 
prevent the bubble formation and burst. 
The most common action after bubble burst 
is to go through different regulations to find 
out why such situation could emerge and 
make necessary correctives (i.e. G20 leaders, 
IMF and other institutions have agreed in the 
necessity to improve international financial 
market regulations). 
2. Recovery of international and local 
trust and capital flows. The restoration of 
international /local trust and capital flows 
can be achieved with the help of different 
measures. It can include package fiscal, 
monetary, labour, foreign trade etc. polivy 
measures. 
Source: Composed by authors. 
2. Swedish experience with property crises  
This section deals with the largest crisis in the Swedish property market since the 
Second World War. It occurred during the early 1990s, following a rapid growth of 
house prices and construction volumes in the other half of 1980s. After five years of 
remarkable growth, the market experienced a three year period of falling property 
prices and the crisis spread to other sectors of the economy as well. Overall, the 
Swedish GDP shrank by 6% and unemployment rose from 3% to 12% during the 
most difficult years.  
Table 2 summarizes some of the main indicators of the Swedish property market 
development, highlighting the start of the boom in 1985, start of the crisis in 1990 
and the end of the crisis in 1997. As always, it is judgmental to set a univocal date 
for the beginnings and ends in an economic crisis. However, based on other 
scholarly works and official statistics, these years were turning points for most of the 
indicators.377
Table 2. Selected indicators of the Swedish property market (1980-1997) 
Indicator 
Base year 
1980
Start of the 
boom 1985 
End of the 
boom 1990
Middle of the 
crisis 1993 
End of the 
crisis 1997 
Investments in the construction sector (real prices, 1980 = 100) 
One-family homes  100  62  88  39  26 
Apartment 
buildings 100 198  241  195  76 
Corporate property  100  93  107  84  96 
Property value in real prices (1980 = 100)   
One-family homes   100  70  97  72  76 
Second homes   100  75  103  83  87 
Apartment 
buildings 100 94  165  93  n.a. 
Corporate property  100 244  422  144  n.a. 
Number transactions (1980 = 100) 
One-family homes  100  113  108  65  107 
Second homes   100  118  125  93  111 
n.a. – not available
Sources: Jaffee (1994a) based on Swedish Statistics Office and Bank for 
International Settlements and authors’ estimations or calculations based on Bostads-
och byggnadsstatistisk årsbok (2008).  
The main reasons behind the boom and the later crisis in the Swedish property 
market could be outlined as follows: 
1. Aggressive marketing of property credits during the boom years, following the 
liberalization of the credit market in 1985. Before that the Swedish banks were 
allowed to determine neither their credit volumes nor their interest rates 
(Boksjö, Lönnborg-Andersson 1994). After the liberalization, most banks saw 
a window of opportunity thanks to the relaxed regulations. The Swedish stock 
of credits rose rapidly from 100% of the GDP to 150% of the GDP. During 
1986 and 1988, the annual growth rates of credits exceeded 20% (Wohlin 
1998).
2. Generous subsidies and tax breaks to loan takers and housing developers. In 
the early 1980s Swedish homeowners were allowed to discount 64% of their 
interest payments in their tax declaration (Jaffee 1994a). In addition, housing 
developers could apply for a subsidy from the government for the construction 
of rental apartments to vulnerable groups, such as students and pensioners. It 
has been estimated (Jaffee 1994a) that various kinds of subsidies to the 
construction sector were around 4% of the GDP, a figure that was considerably 
higher than those in France or Finland (around 1.5% of the GDP) and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (1% of the GDP).  
3. Macroeconomic conditions made credits cheap. During the late 1980s, Sweden 
ran a comparatively high rate of inflation, which reduced the real interest rates. 
An analysis done at Uppsala University demonstrates that for a while, the real 
interest rates were negative when considering the tax breaks mentioned in 378
point 2 (Boksjö, Lönnborg-Andersson 1994). Table 3 provides further details 
of the macroeconomic development prior and during the crisis.  
4. Imbalances in the property market development. During the construction boom 
of the late 1980s, an uneven number of dwellings were completed in different 
parts of the country. While in the major cities, the construction volumes were 
lower than population increase, the opposite was true for some smaller towns. 
As the crisis hit in 1990, the imbalances led to steeper price decreases in those 
towns were comparatively too many new homes had been built (Jaffee 1994a). 
Table 3 demonstrates that macroeconomic conditions also supported first the boom 
and later a crisis in the property market. Following two devaluations of the Swedish 
krona, there was an upward pressure on inflation. The consumer price index doubled 
during the period of 1981 to 1991. Interest rates increased steadily as the crisis 
commenced. For two days in September 1992 the main interest rate of the Swedish 
Central Bank was 500 per cent in a desperate effort to maintain the fixed exchange 
rate of the krona. Thereafter the fixed exchange rate policy was given up.  
Table 3. Selected macroeconomic indicators in Sweden (1980-1997) 
Indicator 
Start of the 
boom 1985 
End of the 
boom 1990 
Middle of 
the crisis 
1993
End of the 
crisis 1997 
Consumer prices change (%)  7.0  10.1  4.8  0.4 
GDP change (%)  2.2  1.0  -2.1  2.5 
Main interest rate (January 1)  n.a. 12.0  11.0  4.1 
Sources: Swedish Statistics Office, Central Bank of Sweden.  
Once the crisis hit, the Swedish government took a number of measures to tackle the 
economic and property market crisis.  
1. One of the most influential steps was the establishment of “bad banks” to take 
over the problematic loans. Two banks (Nordbanken and Gota Bank) had run 
into serious difficulties by 1992. The government decided to take over the 
ownership in those banks. The mortgage portfolio was analyzed and 
problematic credits were transferred into “bad bank”, independent financial 
institutions aiming to find a solution to the credits. Initially, the “healthy” parts 
of the two banks continued operate as normal. In 1993, the banks were merged 
and later partially privatized. The “bad banks” operated until 1997, when it was 
deemed that they were no longer needed (Lundgren 1998). Jennergren and 
Näslund (1998) estimate that the total cost of using „bad banks” as an 
instrument to deal with the financial crisis was around 35 billion Swedish 
kronor. It has been estimated that the total cost of bad credits that the Swedish 
banks had to bear was around 200 billion kronor (Lundgren 1998).  
2. Already before the crisis had begun, some of the generous tax breaks and 
subsidies to homeowners were altered. The share of interest payments that 
could be discounted in the income declaration was first reduced from 64% to 
50% and later on to 30% (Jaffee 1994a).  379
3. Bank Support Committee (Bankstödsnämnden in Swedish) was formed. The 
aim of the Committee was to evaluate the need for public sector support to 
financial institutions and, in case support was deemed to be necessary, to 
determine the amount. The Committee considered where it was likely that bank 
would survive the crisis in medium term, given the share of bad credits, value 
of mortgages and other factors. During the crisis, all seven larger banks in 
Sweden applied for the credit, with the exception of Handelsbanken. S-E-
Banken withdrew its application but all other banks received financial support 
from the Committee (Ingves and Lind 1998).  
4. The central government ran an expansionary fiscal policy during the crisis. 
This caused a budget deficit of up to 12% of the GDP at its highest. In a short 
term perspective, such a measure stimulated the economy and consequently 
avoided an even greater drop in the GDP (Bäckström 1998). However, such a 
policy is not sustainable in the long run and could lead to higher taxes at a later 
stage. Indeed, the overall share of taxes in the GDP increased during 1995 to 
2000 (Ekonomifakta 2009).  
Ingves and Lind (1998) suggest that one of the reasons for a rapid recovery form the 
crisis was the politician’s ability to collaborate at difficult times. For example, the 
opposition parties were included when major decisions, such as the establishment of 
the Bank Support Committee, had to be taken. In addition to economic policy 
measures, the crisis was also tackled through the actions of households and 
enterprises. While during the boom years, consumption had exceeded savings, the 
trend was quickly reversed in the early 1990s. Exporters also contributed to a 
relatively smooth and rapid solution of the crisis (Bäckström 1998).  
3. Ongoing property crisis in Ireland 
Taking into account different data and position of analytics, it can be said that the 
Republic of Ireland is currently witnessing a real estate bubble burst. Ireland has 
seen enormous growth rates during the past years and has been called one of the 
most prosperous countries in the world (so-called Celtic Tiger). However currently 
there has been significant drop in its position in the world’s competitiveness list 
(World Competitiveness Yearbook). The situation in Ireland is deteriorating 
gradually, but no major problems (compared to the magnitude of Swedish 
experience) have risen so far and that is why by now no specific data of government 
measures and their effectiveness is available. Still certain action has been announced 
and they can be analyzed for suitability in Estonian circumstances. 
First of all main factors contributing to Irish real estate boom are being viewed: 
1. Employment and income started to rise, which increased the possibilities of 
buying real estate and that in turn the demand for real estate. At the same time 
productivity was stagnant. 
2. Ireland’s high salaries made it an attractive working place for people all around 
Europe, especially for a large number of Eastern European workers, which in 
turn accelerated the demand for real estate. 380
3. Favourable euro-zone interest rate policy made cost of loans low and in 
addition high growth in real estate value made real estate collateral practically 
risk free. 
4. Government’s budget constantly rose, which made it possible to spend more 
and contribute to private sector driven bubble.  
5. Ireland had remarkably liberal planning policy and there were no remarkable 
development obstacles throughout the country. 
Table 4 shows main indicators of Irish property market. A downturn has been 
evident starting from 2007, reflecting in following features: 
1. Sharp drop in house completions. 
2. Sharp drop in loan approvals. 
3. Drop in property prices (since the mid-2008 situation has become much worse, 
being also property type and location specific, but there was no official data 
available) 
4. Problems in servicing the loans, liquidation sales. 
Table 4. Selected indicators of the Irish property market (1988-2008) 
1988 1998  2006  2008 
Total house completions  15 654  42 349  93 419 (peak 
figure) 
48 190 (11 months) 
Estimate of housing stock 
(incl. vacant) 
1 005 000  1 329 000  1 804 000  1 882 000 (year 
2007) 
Loan approvals  42 543  
(1 430.0 €m)
68 925
(5 654.9 €m) 
114 593  
(31 382.2 €m)
35 181 
(9 948.3 €m) – half 
year
Average new house and 
apartment price (€) 
52 450   125 302  305 637  313 678 – half year 
Average second-hand house 
and apartment price (€) 
50 501  134 529  371 447  356 638 – half year 
National house building 
cost index 
100 – year 
1991
124.9  194.2  209.4 (average 10 
months) 
Source: Department of Environment, Heritage & Local Government. 
Table 5. Selected macroeconomic indicators in Ireland (2006-2009) 
2006 2007 2008  2009  (forecast.) 
GDP growth  5.7%  5.3%  -1.4%  -4.0% 
Unemployment 4.4%  4.5%  6.3% 9.2% 
CPI 4.0%  4.9%  4.1%  -1.0% 
Sources: Bank of Ireland; Addendum to the Irish Stability Program Update. 
The Government of Ireland has agreed upon package of economic measures to fight 
the forthcoming difficulties and the measures include three main categories: 
stabilizing public finances, short-term stabilization of economy and working to 381
initiate major reforms in society. Of those main attention has been drawn on 
economy stabilizing measures as most urgent and tightly connected to real estate. 
(Irish Government Agreement … 2009) 
Beside measures like stimulating and restructuring economy, cutting government 
costs, working to keep as many jobs as possible, certain action has already been 
planned concerning problems in real estate sector and in banking sector influenced 
by real estate sector. For instance Irish government is going to assist those who get 
into difficulties with their mortgages and in early 2009 a new statutory Code of 
Practice in relation to mortgage arrears and home repossessions will be brought 
forward, and the mortgage interest scheme will be reviewed; it is recognized that 
stabilizing the financial and banking sector is essential (Irish Government 
Agreement … 2009). 
Ireland has so far been known for very low repossession rates of real estate by banks 
and building societies, mainly because of the Irish Banking Federation Code of 
Practice for Mortgage Arrears (Irish Banking Federation). The first half of year 2009 
will show how the government directed changes in that code, but also other 
assistance measures will have effect. As repossession rates have so far shown no 
rapid growth, government has so far given no financial aid to banking sector. 
4. Estonian experience with real estate crises combined with structural and 
cyclical crises 
Following section deals with the Estonian real estate and construction sector crises, 
which started to spread into the other economic sectors in the early 2009. The real 
depth of the crises is not clear yet and therefore currently is possible to explain the 
main reasons of the crises and describe the expansion mechanism of the crises. 
Beginning of the Estonian real estate crises was under rather different 
macroeconomic environment compared with highly developed economies (Swedish 
case above). But it shares some common elements of the catching up economies 
with extremely rapidly growing domestic demand and excessive loans inflow (partly 
the Irish case).  
In order to provide better insights into the logic of Estonian real estate crisis 
development the Estonian macroeconomic environment as well fundamentals of the 
privatization policy of the housing used by Estonian government will be provided. 
Major stylized facts about the reasons of real estate crises are following: 
1) During the 1990’s Estonia just started its rapid economic convergence process 
and Estonian income level was still lagging seriously behind the EU-15. 
Estonian PPP adjusted GDP per capita formed only 42.3% of EU-15 average in 
year 1999 (Eurostat 2009). Therefore all factors facilitating nominal and real 
convergence process (e.g. differences in factor prices, unmet demand of 
customers, outdated housing stock etc) started to work. Between 2000 and 
2007 Estonian economy experienced in average GDP growth rate of 8.2% 
which is among the highest in the group of emerging economies (Eurostat 
2009).382
2) During the late 1990’s due to the Asian and Russian crises the interest rates in 
Estonian economy were very high – around 12% (see Table 6), reflecting the 
high risk perceptions of foreign banks toward investing into Estonian economy.  
3) Message given in 1998 by EU about the inclusion of Estonia into the first 
group of EU new entrants provided foreign investors (particularly from 
Finland and other Scandinavian countries) strong incentives to invest into 
Estonian economy. The inflow of FDI into Estonia increased rapidly. 
4) After the Russian crises in 1998 almost 95% of Estonian banking sector was 
acquired by foreign investors (SEB, Swedbank). Positive news about the 
Estonian future joining with EU reduced the risk perspectives and ended up 
with the rapid reduction of interest rates provided by foreign banks to 
customers in Estonia.  
5) Privatization policy of Estonian government was extremely important enabling 
factor of the real estate boom. Prior to privatisation in January 1993 the 
Estonian state owned 25.8%; municipalities 34.7%, cooperatives 5% and 
private sector 34.5% of all housing units (Eesti eluruumide … 2002). Through 
the privatisation process ownership as well responsibility and maintenance of 
housing was transferred from the state and municipal governments to 
individuals. Virtually the whole housing stock built during the Soviet period by 
state and municipalities (around 400 000 square metres) was given using so-
called privatization vouchers (without any real payment) to the families living 
in those apartments (Derrick et al. 1999). By the end of 2001 the privatization 
was finished and around 95.8% of housing units were in private ownership, 
which was among the biggest ratios in the Europe (Eesti Vabariigi … 2002).  
6) The outcome of the privatisation was the creation of the huge group of owners, 
who gained opportunity to use their property as collateral in order to get loans 
from the banking sector. This lucrative opportunity created strong interest 
among foreign commercial banks to offer housing loans for the renovation and 
building new better quality houses and apartments. Extremely intensive 
competition between foreign banks for the Estonian customers combined with 
the decline of EURIBOR created rapid reduction of interest rates. It was 
already the launching signal of the real estate boom. 
The above described combination of the use of privatized housing stock, reduction 
of interest rates and huge increase in housing loans provided by the foreign owned 
commercial banks, strong economic growth, moderate inflation and rapid wage 
increase resulted in the unprecedented growth of housing market. This imbalance 
was further fuelled by the tax incentives provided by the Estonian government to the 
individuals in the form of deductions from the housing loan interest payments. 383
Table 6. Growth of selected macroeconomic and real estate sector indicators in 
Estonia between 1999 and 2008 (cumulative, 1999=100) 
Indicators  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Nominal GDP   100 114  130 145 163 181 208 246 286 299
Consumer price index  100  104  110  114  115  119  124  129  138  152 
Average gross wage   100  111  124  138  151  164  182  212  255  282 
Stock of home loans in 
value  100 133 180 276 444 698 1219 1992 2619 2891 
Apartment price in 
Tallinn  *  100  106  173 233 225 300 339 508 573 480 
Numbers of transactions 
with  property    100  114  124 120 140 150 187 187 148 86 
Total value of property 
transactions 100  132  158 190 250 328 566 847 657 309 
Average interest rate of 
home loans*  12.1 11.6  11.0  9.6 5.2 4.1 3.8 4.1 5.4 6.6 
Growth of living space 
(in  thousand.  m2)  68  65  80  70  110 220 280 330 390 570 
* Average quality apartments, price of the square metre, 3 rd quarter of all years  
** Interest rates in percentage during the third quarter of all years  
After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 housing construction in Estonia 
dramatically decelerated and between 1996 and 2001 only around 60-70 thousand 
square-metres of living space was built (Eesti Vabariigi … 2002). But in 2003 the 
dwelling stock increased by 110 and in 2008 already around 570 thousand square-
metres. The housing market boom was supported by a massive expansion of the 
mortgage market. Outstanding housing loans grew from EEK 4.5 billion (€286 
million) in 2000 to EEK 97 billion (€6.2bn) in 2008 or in relative terms from 4.7% 
of GDP in 2000, to 41% in 2008. It means that housing loans grew 29 times between 
1999 and 2008 (Estonian Bank 2009). It created huge demand for properties in 
Estonia – e.g. the average price of 2-room flats in Tallinn (capital of Estonia) rose by 
573 % from 2000 to 2007 (see in Table 6). Estonia experienced between 1998 and 
2008 the highest house prices increase within the whole Europe (see Figure 1). The 
percentage changes in house prices (or the house price index) over 10 years using 
the latest data available, not adjusted for inflation was in Estonia 352 percent, 
followed by Spain (172%) and Ireland (157%). In contrast the housing price 
increase in Germany was only 3%. (Global Property Guide 2009). 384
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Figure 1. House price change in Europe within last ten years in % (between 1998 
and 2008). (Global Property Guide 2009) 
But after the years of rapid growth, the Estonian property market experienced a 
stagnation in late 2007 and during the 2008 property prices started to decline. 
Tightening loan standards in the wake of the international financial crisis, falling 
house prices and an abrupt turnaround of consumer confidence have put an end to 
expanding domestic demand, which has been shrinking since mid-2008. Pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy of Estonian government has added negative stimulus.  
The rapid decline of the property prices is just beginning in early 2009. The 
spreading of the crises from the real estate and construction sector into other sectors 
of the economy started during the second half of 2008. Overall, the Estonian GDP 
shrank by 2% in 2008 and the forecasts for the GDP decline in 2009 are between 5 
and 8 percent. Unemployment rose from 4.5% in 2007 up op 9% by the end of 2008 
and forecasts are around 12-14 % for the end of 2009.  
Estonian government behaviour during the current crises has been quite weak and 
followed pro-cyclical approach. During the rapid economic growth years fiscal 
policy was expansionary and aimed to reduce taxes and expand government 
spending. Particularly toward property market government launched tax incentives 
to the individuals in the form of deductions from the housing loan interest payments. 
The most important problem of the government was postponement of the accepting 
the idea, that property market crises will spread over into the whole economy. The 
government accepted late 2008 a state budget of Estonia for the 2009, which was 
extremely optimistic and unrealistic. Already in February 2009 the need for the huge 
negative supplementary budget (EEK 8bn or €500million) became evident and it 
will be sent to the parliament mid February 2009.  385
Conclusion and policy recommendations 
In this article we have discussed the causes and courses of property market crises 
and pointed to policy measures to overcome the crises using examples from Sweden, 
Ireland and Estonia. While the macroeconomic conditions might vary, a number of 
similarities can be found across the three countries and their respective situations.  
Based on the examples discussed above, we can suggest that a property crisis is 
preceded by a period of rapid economic growth and/or expansion of the credit 
market. In a situation where the possibility of borrowing at a low interest rate 
emerges, banks and households take the opportunity offered by the market. As a 
consequence, the loans flow into the mortgage market putting an upward pressure on 
prices, which in turn generates a highly speculative property market. For a while, the 
credit and property markets will expand but at a point where the discrepancy 
between the fundamentals of the economy and the actual price levels becomes 
unsustainable, the bubble bursts and the country slides into a crisis. An important 
issue is also favourable planning policy and availability of building permits, which 
additionally boosts property market. 
Based on a comparison of the Irish and Swedish experiences with the Estonian case, 
we propose the following policy (of which some are short-term and other long-term) 
recommendations for the management of the current property crisis in Estonia:  
1) Subsidies and tax breaks are a common tool to stimulate property markets but 
they should be employed with caution. The Swedish experience suggests that 
generous subsidies may cause an overheated credit market where the risks are born 
by the government. For example, before the Swedish property crisis, 50% of interest 
costs were tax deductible, leading to negative real interest rates at certain periods. In 
Estonia, the situation is potentially worse, because taking into account maximum 
deduction sum a large proportion of borrowers can deduct 100% of interest cost. 
However, we would not recommend changing the tax rules stricter for the time being 
because this could do further harm to those affected by the crisis. Instead, 
provisional change of tax rules to help the most endangered social groups could be 
thought of. For instance one possibility in local circumstances would be to give 
problem families temporary possibility to deduct not only interest payments, but also 
principal payments. Other options would include connecting deductions with 
number of children, working members of household, area of living space per one 
member of household etc. But after coming out of the crises it is recommended to 
phase out favourable tax treatment and credit guarantees of housing loans, which 
fuelled the housing boom (see e.g. also OECD recommendations, 2009). 
2) In the long-term, we would encourage policy measures that give the loan-taker 
more responsibility and make lending stricter. At the moment the bubble has been 
driven by relatively free lending policy of commercial banks and poor credit scoring. 
The other issue is the lack of sufficient self-finance (many loans were issued with 
0% self-finance). Leaders of G20 countries agreed already in late 2008 that banking 
regulations need to go through thorough audit (G20 declaration full text). The short-386
term regulative issue would be to force Estonian banks to start cooperation through 
Estonian Bank Association to agree upon unified code of practice on mortgage 
arrears.  
3) Expansionary fiscal policy would expose Estonia to considerable risks. In the 
Swedish case, the government opted for a solution based on an expansionary fiscal 
policy, leading to budget deficit and inflation. The conditions of the Estonian 
economy, most importantly the fixed exchange rate regime (currency board system) 
and the prospects of joining the Euro in a few years, make such an approach 
unfavourable for Estonia. Heavily expansionary policy could increase the 
inflationary threat and also push budget deficit above the three percent thus 
eliminating any prospects to fulfil Maastricht criteria and join euro-zone.  
4) In order to restore competitiveness of the Estonian economy resources should be 
shifted from serving domestic demand (including property market related activities) 
to producing for export demand, despite the currently very weak international 
demand. This measure would help to avoid loss of jobs due to contraction of 
businesses oriented to domestic market. Government has already announced 
extensive package for export oriented SMEs. 
5) For compensating the collapse of the domestic demand households and firms 
need to accept lower prices and wages. Deflation is better than devaluation for 
several reasons. The most important is the fact, that the whole housing loan stock of 
households and also big part of firms loans are nominated in euro (around the size of 
95% of annual GDP). Correction in bubble-time living standard back to more steady 
state level is needed. When price correction is mostly done by market without 
government intervention (except no additional value added tax should be 
introduced) then wage drop could be made easier through labour law.  
6) Financial stability should be strengthened, while distortions that contributed to the 
housing boom should be removed. Given the role of foreign-financed credit in the 
boom combined with the current recession Estonian Financial Supervision Authority 
should carefully monitor risks and intensify cooperation with the foreign supervisory 
bodies. In addition government and municipalities should look through land zoning 
and building permit issuing regulations in order to cool down development activity. 
7) Government should work together with Estonian Bank and foreign commercial 
banks in order to tackle “bad loan” problem and find balanced solutions to avoid 
collapse of housing market and create system of softening conditions for households 
in difficulties. 
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